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NOTES
GROUP THERAPY AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
INTRODUCTION

Group psychotherapy has really come into its own since
World War II. It is currently used in most, if not all,
psychiatric state hospitals in the country; it is used extensively in outpatient clinics, adult and child guidance clinics,
correctional institutions, alcoholic treatment centers, and increasingly more in the private practice of psychiatry and
psychology. The enhanced practice of group psychotherapy
is reflected in the rapidly increasing niembership of the
American Group Psychotherapy Association and in the rapid
growth of the literature in the field.
Many of the difficulties with patients are caused or aggravated by failure of communication, distorted perceptions of
other people, or a distorted self-image. Erroneous assumptions are made about what others think and fear which results
in inappropriate behavior, often with harmful psychological
and social consequences. Moreover, many patients consider
themselves unique in their difficulties or fear that their problems, if known by others, would result in ridicule and
rejection.
In the group therapy situation, the patient learns to understand, and communicates with, others either similarly or differently afflicted with emotional difficulties. He is more
likely to acquire a sense of proportion about his problems
when viewed in this kind of therapeutic milieu than he
would when he discusses his problems in the privacy of an
individual therapist. It is through his interactions with other
patients in a group that he learns to communicate more
effectively with his peers and that he is made to realize
that many of his fears and anxieties are shared by others
or may be exaggerated or unfounded. This cannot be so
readily achieved in individual therapy. One of the most pronounced effects of group treatment is an increase in selfrespect and a corresponding reduction of tension and appre-
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hension in the company of other people.'
These statements by a current practitioner present a brief insight
into the extensive use of the group method in present-day psychotherapy,2 and they point out the important medical rationale for its
existence. Experimentation with group psychotherapy began in the
early 1900's, 3 but only since the World War II period has it evolved
as a widespread means of treatment. As a result of the war, a prevalence
of psychological disabilities arose which necessitated group treatment.
The abundance of patients compared with the limited number of
therapists had really left little choice in such major institutions as
the Veterans Administration Hospitals and others but to turn to the
group method. The first prime reason, therefore, for the extensive
application of group psychotherapy was simply a reason based in the
principle of efficient allocation of medical resources. The shortage of
psychotherapists has never cured itself, and the responsibility of
therapists for vast numbers of patients is a definite present and future
reason for the existence of group therapy on a widespread basis.'
The opening interview also indicates that the justification for
group psychotherapy lies in its intrinsic merits, i.e., its therapeutic
value. Its therapeutic value has caused group psychotherapy to become
a discipline per se. Research indicates that the 1906-1955 period
produced 1,747 published works on group psychotherapy, and the ten
year period subsequent to this has produced works which in number
exceed that entire fifty year period.'
Group therapy is applied to the whole spectrum of emotional
and behavioral problems. It is used for both adults and children, and
1. Interview with Dr. Hanus J. Grosz, Associate Professor of Psychiatry and
Senior Clinical Investigator at the Institute of Psychiatric Research at Indiana
University; Chief of Neurology and Psychiatry at the Veterans Administration
Hospital, Indianapolis, Indiana, in Indianaplois, Indiana, April 3, 1967.

2. See also

LUCHINS, GROUP THERAPY

ch. 1 (1964) and

SCHOFIELD,

PSYCHO-

THERAPY 167-168 (1964).
3. GARFIELD, INTRODUCTORY CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 294 (1957).
4. POWDERMAKER, GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 1 (1953).

5. "If all the 15,000 M.D.'s in the U.S. who are psychiatrists, plus all the

psychiatric social workers and all the psychologists trained as therapists, spent all their
working hours with individual patients, they would still be able to treat only one in
ten of the Americans who need help for emotional ills." TIME, Feb. 8, 1963, at 38.

"Given the shortage of psychotherapists, one might foresee a time in the near
future when patients may be treated primarily in group situations." Schechter, The
Integration of Group Therapy with Individual Psychoanalysis, 1 CURRENT PSYCHIATRIC
THERAPIES 145 (Masserman ed. 1961). Economic considerations are also important.

The group system has been said to lessen individual costs from an average of approximately twenty dollars per session to as little as fifty cents for the needy and four or five
dollars for those in middle income brackets. TimE, Feb. 8, 1963, at 38.
6. LUBIN & LUBIN, GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY, A BIBLIOGRAPHY PREFACE (1966).
See also LUCHINS, GROUP THERAPY 9 (1964); Daniels, McFarland, & Solon, Group
Psychotherapy,17 PROGRESS IN NEUROLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY 526 (1962).
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essentially it can be applied to all patients who are candidates for
psychotherapy in general, even though there are many selection procedures that are applied in the formation of a group.7 The inherent
advantages of group therapy are the result of enabling the therapist
to work with his patient in a social setting, i.e., an environment
characteristic of the patient's everyday life as opposed to the more
unusual situation of the patient's associating with the therapist alone.
There is a simulation of the patient's outside relationships, and his
weaknesses can be discovered and treated accordingly. For the patient,
the group can be used to provide a variety of ameliorative changes.
These include a lessening of feelings of isolation by providing new
identifications, mutual support, and improved self-assertion and selfesteem. The realization that others have similar problems can diminish
feelings of guilt, fear, and unrealistic dependency; and the ability to
see another person's problem better than one's own can increase both
the patient's objectivity and his capacity to approach new points of
view. Finally, there is an opportunity for group members to associate
their activities in group therapy to their outside relationships, and the
successful personality changes achieved in group therapy can be
correlated by the patient to apply to his outside role as a member
of natural groups.'
The intrinsic merits of group psychotherapy, its economic justifications, and its very substantial growth are all symptomatic of its
future utilization on an even more widespread basis. Because its
expansion has been recent and because there appear to be no reported
cases involving group therapy problems, the entire subject matter has
been hidden from the legal commentators and very little consideration
has been given to the group as a legal entity. Resulting from the
relationship of group therapy to the physician-patient situation, the
question of privileged communications raises what is probably the
dominant legal problem presented by the existence of the group. The
subsequent discussion is intended to meet this problem by considering
the questions of whether or not the participants in a group psychotherapeutic situation should have legally privileged communications
and, primarily, whether or not their communications are privileged
under present law.
RATIONALE FOR THE PRIVILEGE

Ralph Slovenko, one of the foremost authorities in the area of
7.

Grosz, supran. 1.

S. See, JOHNSON,

GROUP THERAPY 2 (1963); WI1THAKR & LIEBERMAN, PSYCHOTHERAPY THROUGH THE GROUP PROCESS ch. 8 (1964); BACH, INTENSIVE GRouP PSYCHOTHERAPY 3, 271-272 (1954) ; FOULKES, THERAPEUTIC GROUP ANALYSIS 33 (1965).
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psychotherapy and privileged communication, gives only summary
discussion to the group therapy problem.' However, he points out that
it does seem necessary "to reformulate the medical privilege in view
of group therapy."'" Slovenko presents what is perhaps the most
comprehensive case to date for granting a privileged communication
in a "dyadic" psychotherapy relationship. He applies the renowned
Wigmore criteria for a privileged communication 1 ' to the psychotherapist-patient relationship and concludes that each of these criteria
are satisfied." Similar findings supporting the psychotherapistpatient privilege have been reached almost unanimously by the legal
writers who have dealt with it.' Their reasoning for supporting a
psychotherapeutic privilege is clear in light of the notion that if
therapists are forced to testify as to information received during
therapy, patients will hesitate to disclose fully their thoughts and, as
a result, they will not adequately benefit from treatment. Any psychotherapeutic situation requires frank self-disclosure, and the general
feeling among therapists is that nothing inhibits a patient's frankness
as much as the fear that his confidences will be used against him. 4
Therapists must prevent the existence of conditions that would stifle a
confidential relationship, for they must be free to insist on very
personal data in exploring the nexus between the patient's acts and his
basic drives. It has been said that the psychiatric patient confides to a
greater extent than anyone else in the world, for the nature of his
effective communication is characterized by those thoughts which are
the most difficult to expose.'" This is true for the patient of the psychol9.

SLOVENKO,

PSYCHOTHERAPY,

CONFIDENTIALITY,

AND

PRIVILEGED

COMMUNICA-

TION 119 (1966).

10. Id. at 119.
11. (1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3)
The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation. 8 WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
12. SLOVENKO, supra note 9, at 37-52.
13. See e.g., Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged
Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 609 (1964) ; Guttmacher and Weihofen, Privileged
Communications between Psychiatrist and Patient, 28 IND. L.J. 32 (1952) ; Rappeport,
Psychiatrist-PatientPrivilege, 23 MD. L. REv. 39 (1963) ; Slovenko, Psychiatry and a
Second Look at the Medical Privilege,6 WAYNE L. REv. 175 (1960).
14. SzAsz, THE ETHICS OF PsYcHOANALYSIS 144 (1965).
15. ". . . he lays bare his entire self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his
shame. Most patients who undergo psychotherapy know that this is what will be

expected of them, and that they cannot get help except on that condition. It is extremely
hard for them to bring themselves to the point where they are willing to expose the
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ogist also as he undergoes the processes of psychotherapy.
With reference to group psychotherapy in particular, confidentiaity is needed for essentially the same reasons. Corsini, a noted author
and practitioner in the field of group therapy, refers to "protected"
groups in his definition of group psychotherapy, and he later explains
his employment of the adjective by the following language:
An essential concept in psychotherapy is that of protection.
In psychotherapy there is always an understanding, whether
implicit or explicit, that the individual members are freed
from some of the usual responsibilities for their behavior.
In a therapeutic situation a person can say and do things that
the group would not permit under other circumstances. The
member of a therapeutic group understands that as a part of
the process of self-exploration, he may safely operate in certain ways not generally acceptable in society. He expects that
his communications will be regarded as privileged (i.e., confidential), and he understands that he is to respect the secrets
of other members. 6
It should also be noticed that in disclosing information in the
dyadic relationship, a patient concerned about confidentiality would
certainly feel more assured of its maintenance than he would when
first sitting down to a group meeting. He would be less defensive on
this point in the one-to-one relationship simply because of the ethicality
assumed about most therapists and also because of the lesser mathematical probability of future disclosures by one person being apprised
of his secrets rather than more than one. Any resistance based on
fear of redisclosure would naturally be less because of these reasons;
conversely, inhibitions based on such fear would be stronger in the
group situation and would more intensely prevent the frank selfdisclosure which is requisite in effective therapy.
dark recesses of their mind to the psychiatrist; often patients have undergone therapy

for a year or more before they begin to reveal anything significant. It would be too
much to expect them to do so if they knew that all they say-and all that the psychiatrist
learns from what they say-may be revealed to the whole world from a witness
stand."

GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952).
See also GRouP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY (Report No. 45, 1960);

and Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
16. CORSINI, METHODS OF GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 132 (1957). See also, BACH,
INTENSivE GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 30 (1954), in which it is pointed out that participating
patients assume the same professional ethics of absolute discretion that bind professional
therapists, and in which it is emphasized that only through open communication will the
group become a therapeutically effective medium; BRAMMER AND SHOLSTROM, THERAPEUTIC PSYCHOLOGY (1963).
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Is THE GROUP PRIVILEGED
In speaking of the group therapy privilege, a realization that
actually two privileges are involved is imperative. No generally accepted definition of group therapy presently exists,"7 but for purposes
of a legal analysis the predominant group situation can be considered
to consist of a therapist(s) and multiple numbers of patients." Therapists consist of both psychiatrists and psychologists. As a result there
is a relationship between each patient and the therapist (formally, this
relationship is either medical or quasi-medical) and a relationship
between each of the patients themselves. Therefore, the two privilges
are therapist-patient and patient-patient; but in considering whether
or not a group privilege can exist, the two will be discussed together
for certainly neither would be effective if the other were not also
enforced.
Within the present statutory framework of medical and quasimedical privileged communications, there are essentially four variations of privileges-physician-patient, 9 psychiatrist-patient," psychologist-patient, 2 ' and psychotherapist- patient.2" Scattered haphazardly
LUcHINS, GROUP THERAPY 11 (1964).
18. Although the number of people in a group is subject to variation, most groups
consist of one therapist and five to ten patients. Occasionally two therapists will vork
with the group, thereby lending additional knowledge and experience to the subsequent
analyses. Frequently, the number of patients will also vary beneath or beyond the
above mentioned average.

17.

19. ALASKA RULES OF CT. PROC. & ADMIN., Civ. Rules 43(h) (4) (1963); ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1802(5), 12-2235 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28.607 (1962);
CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 1881 (West Supp. 1966); COLO. RPv. STAT. ANN. § 154-1-7(5)
(1964); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307 (1966); HAWAII REv. LAWs § 222-20 (1955);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203 (Supp. 1967) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 51 § 5.1 (1966) ; INn.
ANN. STAT. § 2-1714 (Bums repl. 1946); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-427 (Supp.

1965); Ky. REv. STAT. § 213.200 (1962); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 15.476 (1967); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (1947); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1697 (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN
STAT. § 491.060 (1952); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-701-4(4) (1964); NEB. Rav.
STAT. § 25-1206 (1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12 (1954); N.Y. CiV. PRac. §
4504(a) (1963); NEv. REV. STAT. § 48.080 (1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06 (Supp.
1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §
385 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 44.050(d) ,1959-60); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28 § 328
(1958); S.D. CODE § 36.0101(3) (1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(4) (1953);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-289.1 (Supp. 1966); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(4) (Supp.
1966); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-6-10 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 325.21 (1958):
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-139(1) (1959).
20. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-146a (Supp. 1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-418
(Supp. 1966); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1516 (1947); COL. REv. STAT. ANN. § 154-1-7(8)

24-112 (Supp. 1966).
21. ALA. CODE tit. 46 § 297(36) (Supp. 1965); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-2085
(Supp. 1966); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1516 (1947); COL. REv. STAT. ANN. § 154-1-7(8)
(1963) ; DEL CODE ANN. tit. 24 § 3534 (Supp. 1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-3118 (1955) ;
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-2314 (Supp. 1965); IowA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (1950); Ky.
REv. STAT. § 319.110 (1962); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.677(18) (Supp. 1965); MONT

REv. CODES ANN. §93-701-4(6) (1964); NEv. REv. STAT. § 48.085 (1963); N.H. R.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-30-17 (Supp. 1967); N.Y.

STAT. ANN. § 330-A:19 (1966);
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among many states, these statutes total nearly seventy in number, yet
only two of them might possibly include group therapy and two can be
said partially to include group therapy. (This language will be
explained subsequently.) By their wording, the remainder of the
statutes do not provide for a group privilege.
In general, these "non-group" statutes present a stiuation that
would provide little opportunity for extension of the privilege to group
therapy. Since group therapy is practiced primarily by both psychiatrists and psychologists, i.e. by both medical and non-medical practitioners, a specific statute's first effect will usually be to grant the
privilege to either one or the other. Secondly, the statutes granting
a privileged communication are in derogation of the common law and
as a result they frequently receive strict constructions." One of the
clearest examples of the inconsistencies caused by this strict construction is State v. Bediuasek.24 Here, a psychologist and a psychiatrist
had both worked with the defendant, and under the Iowa "physicianpatient" statute the psychiatrist (a physician) was not called as a
witness yet the psychologist was required to testify. Considering that
this type of approach is frequently taken toward the existing privilege
statutes, it seems practically impossible even to consider extending
their coverage to a group situation. Furthermore, the presence of several
people at the scene of the communication, a concept axiomatic to the
group process, creates additional problems for the legal maintenance
of confidentiality. With reference to the physician-patient privilege
there are some cases which require third persons at the scene of the
communication to testify even though the physician was privileged
from doing so as a result of the statute.2" In a group therapy situation,
this would mean that even if the therapist were covered by the statute,
other patients could be compelled to testify as to what a particular
Fiuc. § 7611 (McKinney Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59 § 1372 (Supp. 1966) ;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1117 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-259 (1963); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-289.1 (Supp. 1966); WAsH. RLV. CODE ANN. § 18.83.110 (1961); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 33-343.6 (Supp. 1965).
22. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1010-1026 (West 1966) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-427
(Supp. 1965).
23. E.g., Strizak v. Industrial Comm'n, 159 Ohio St. 475, 112 N.E.2d 537 (1953);
Meyers v. State, 192 Ind. 592, 137 N.E. 547 (1922) ; In Re Golder's Estate 37 S.D. 397,
158 N.W. 734 (1916).
24. Criminal Cause 2694, Johnson County Dist. Ct. (Iowa 1950).
25. E.g., Springer v. Byram, 137 Ind. 15, 36 N.E. 361 (1893); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Brubaker, 78 Kan. 146, 96 Pac. 62 (1908) ; Denarco v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
554 App. Div. 840, 139 N.Y.S. 758 (1913). Some jurisdictions say both the physician

and the third person may testify, e.g., Horowitz v. Sacks, 89 Cal. App. 336, 265 Pac. 28
(1928); State v. Knight, 204 Iowa 819, 216 N.W. 104 (1927).

The reasoning here is

apparently that the communications were not meant to be confidential and are therefore
not privileged.
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member said. Clearly, such a result would undermine the purpose
of the statute.
Other cases look to the relationship between the third person and the
physician, and if the third person (e.g., a nurse, medical assistant,
or stenographer) is assisting or acting under the direction of the
physician in the treatment of the patient, then by implication the
third person is included within the privilege." This brings into focus
the question of an agency relationship in determining whether or not
the statutes can be extended to those people working under the
physician's direction. In trying to extend the existing statutes to cover
the group therapy situation, it might be possible to follow an agency
approach in those jurisdictions that stretch their statutes to cover the
agents of the physician. By so "stretching," of course, these jurisdictions abandon the concept of strict construction and take a liberal
approach based on the notion that even though the statutes are in
derogation of the common law, they are remedial in nature and should
therefore be liberally construed." It is quite possible that in a liberal
jurisdiction a convincing argument could be made demonstrating that
psychotherapy patients, being studied under group conditions by a
therapist who himself is covered by the patient's privilege, are agents
of the therapist and are thereby freed from a judicial requirement
of disclosure. Under this type of argument, they are agents because
just like any other "medical assistant," they are performing a function
of working with the therapist toward the correction of the other
patients' problems. As was demonstrated earlier, the group is used by
the therapist to create certain verbal interactions necessary in the
process of treating every group patient. Certainly, an examination
of the function performed by the group on any particular patient
reveals that it is not unlike the function performed by a nurse or a
consulting therapist. Just as a nurse aids the physician in treating a
medical patient, so does each patient in group therapy aid the therapist
in treating other patients. It seems evident, however, that if the
existing statutes are to be extended to this new area, the extension can
only come through the application of an agency argument combined
with a liberal judicial interpretation of the statutes. This much liberality
is only possible in a jurisdiction that approaches its statute as "remedial" rather than as "in derogation of the common law"; and even
26. E.g., Hogan v. Bateman, 184 Ark. 842, 43 S.W.2d 721 (1931); People v.

Wasker, 353 Mich. 447, 91 N.W.2d 866 (1958); Culver v. Union Pac. R.R., 112 Neb.
441, 199 N.W. 794 (1924).
27. E.g., Kramer v Policy Holder's Life Ins. Ass'n., 5 Cal. App. 2d 380, 42 P.2d
665 (1935) ; New York City Council v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940).
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in such a jurisdiction the statute might be limited in its use simply
because it applies to either a psychologist or a psychiatrist, and the
therapist in the particular case bears the incorrect title.
Of the four group statutes, the two which might possibly include
group therapy in the above inclusive definition are the California28
and Kansas" statutes. By "inclusive definition," reference is made
to the fact that groups are utilized by both psychiatrists and psychologists as opposed to either one in particular. Since both types of
therapists practice under this method, an effective group statute would
need to provide for both, and the California statute does make this
provision. Under section 1010, the statute defines "psychotherapist"
to include both a psychiatrist and a psychologist. Under section 1012,
the statute defines "confidential communication between patient and
psychotherapist" as
[i] nformation, including information obtained by an examination of the patient, transmitted between a patient and his
psychotherapist in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the patient is aware,
discloses the information to no third persons other than those
who are present to further the interests of the patient in the
consultation or examination or those to whom disclosure is
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information
or the accomplishment of the purpose of the consultation or
examination....
This definition would seem to mean that in the psychotherapeutic
setting, the receiving of communications by necessary participants
other than the psychotherapist would still enable the communications
to remain confidential. In group therapy, disclosure is "reasonably
necessary" for the accomplishment of the purpose when such disclosure
is made in the presence of other group patients. The very rationale for
the use of group therapy confirms this. However, although the California statute can be described as inclusive with regard to its reaching
group sessions under both psychiatrists and psychologists, it was
earlier described as a statute which only might possibly be applicable
to group therapy. The reason for this skepticism is the statutory
language in section 1012 which speaks of information "transmitted
between a patient and his psychotherapist" and further statutory
language in section 1014 (the privilege-granting section) which makes
privileged "a confidential communication between patient and psycho28.
29.

CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1010-1026 (West 1966).
KAN. GEN. STAT. Axx § 60-427 (Supp. 1965).
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therapist." (emphasis added). Both of these sections hint that for the
communication to be privileged, it must be directed from the patient to
the therapist. Group therapy, of course, involves communications
between the patients themselves as well as those directed to the
therapist and merely overheard by other patients. For a group privilege
to exist, the former communications must definitely be privileged also
and, should the California courts choose to interpret the statute contra,
the statute would fail to present a group privilege. However, to advocate
a position favoring a group privilege under this statutory language
would not be unfeasible. Certainly, a very rational argument could be
made on the basis of presenting those patients spoken to by the one
claiming the privilege as mere conduits for communications which, in
the end result, are really directed to the therapist in his role as the
ultimate producer of ameliorative changes in the patient. Accepting
such an argument would lead to the result that the information was
"transmitted between a patient and his psychotherapist," and the
California statute could then be considered a "group privilege" statute.
The Kansas statute is titled as one granting a "physician-patient"
privilege. It obviously was designed to apply to some forms of psychotherapy because its definitional section, section 60-427 (a), defines
"patient" in terms of one with a "physical or mental condition." But
since only psychiatrists (as opposed to psychologists) are technically
physicians, the statute would not seem to meet the "inclusive" test
of applying to both psychiatrists and psychologists. However, section
60-427(a) defines "physician"e as "a person licensed or reasonably
believed by the patient to be licensed to practice medicine or one of
the healing arts as defined in K.S.A. 65-2802 ...

"

Section 65-2802

then defines the "healing arts" as
• . . any system, treatment, operation, diagnosis, prescription,
or practice for the ascertainment, cure, relief, palliation, adjustment, or correction of any human disease, ailment, deformity, or injury, and includes specifically but not by way
of limitation the practice of medicine and surgery; the
practice of osteopathy; and the practice of chiropractic.
In light of this very broad definition of the "healing arts," it could be
said that "physician" was meant to include "psychologist," and if
such an interpretation were to be reached by the Kansas courts, this
statute would be as "inclusive" as the California psychotherapist
statute. Since the language is so broad, and since the definition of
"patient" does show an obvious intention to include patients with
mental conditions, a strong argument could be made demonstrating
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that the statute does include both psychiatrists and psychologists; for
in essence, when the psychologist is practicing psychotherapy his goal
of bringing about ameliorative changes in a patient's mental condition
is the same goal as that pursued by the psychiatrist.
But even assuming that this statute were to be interpreted in the
"inclusive" sense, it is grouped with the California statute mainly
because it too only might possibly be applicable to group therapy.
The Kansas statute in section 60-427(b) talks in terms of information
transmitted between physician and patient, and even though this statute
also maintains the privilege in the presence of third persons, the
semantics of utilizing the preposition "between" creates the same
problem discussed with regard to the California statute. Once again,
the "conduit theory" would be most applicable.
The Connecticut3 ° and Illinois"' statutes are the two which only
partially include group therapy. Both of these statutes are clearly
worded to include only therapy under a psychiatrist. Neither statute
is "inclusvie." 2 However, even with this limitation, there is little
doubt that these two statutes do create a "group privilege," i.e., a
privilege that extends to those communications directly between patients
as well as to those between patient and therapist. It therefore eliminates
the "questionable" aspects of the California and Kansas statutes. Since
the Connecticut and Illinois statutes are almost identical in the wordings
of their respective privilege-granting subsections, either can be used
to demonstrate this last point. The Connecticut statute grants the
basic privilege in the following terms:
. . . In civil and criminal cases, in proceedings preliminary
thereto, and in legislative and administrative proceedings, a
patient, or his authorized representative, has a privilege to
refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness from disclosing,
communications relating to diagnosis or treatment of the
patient's mental condition between patient and psychiatrist,
or between members of the patient's family and the psychiatrist, or between any of the foregoing and such persons who
participate, under the supervision of the psychiatrist, in the
30. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-146(a) (Supp. 1965).
31. Ira.. ANN. STAT. ch. 51 § 5.2 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
32. Goldstein and Katz, members of the drafting committee for the Connecticut

statute, point out that the failure to extend the privilege to psychologists is a result of
some members of the drafting committee believing that the bill would go too far and
of other members believing that legislative support for the bill would be too difficult to
obtain. Goldstein and Katz, Psychiatrist-PatientPrivilege: The GAP Proposal and the
Connecticut Statute, 36 CONN. B.J. 185 n. 19 (1962).
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accomplishment of the objectives of diagnosis or treatment."
Clearly, the clause "or between any of the foregoing . . . treatment"
does provide for an extension of the privilege to those communications
between patients and, as a result, one can understand why such a
statute is more easily supportable as applicable to group therapy than
are the statutes of California and Kansas.
CONCLUSION
The overall discussion has been in the nature of examining the
growing utilization of group therapy, its need for a privilege, and the
legal framework within which a privilege might be found. The need
for a privilege is obvious. In group treatment, the atmosphere must
be one which fosters effective verbal interactions, and only if the
patients are willing to disclose their most confidential and embarrassing secrets will the result of their group experience be truly therapeutic.
No argument by a group therapist on the need for maintaining strict
confidence could be as persuaisve as a mere introspection. Few people
could deny their own hesitancy to disclose to others that which is most
embarrassing to them. So too, such disclosures are frequently the ones
with the most legal ramifications, and if a person knew that the
disclosures could one day be compelled from his confidants in a
courtroom, his hesistancy so to confide would be increased immeasurably.
When this requirement for a privilege is viewed not in the light
of the limited application of group therapy in the early 1940's but
instead in the perspective of its extensive application in the 1960's,
it should be apparent that the present legal system of granting medical
and quasi-medical privileges is somewhat obsolete. The application of
an agency argument to the dyadic privilege statutes was shown to have
definite shortcomings as a result of the nature of the judicial system.
The four "group statutes" were demonstrated as very possibly being
effective privilege-granting statutes, yet they were shown to contain
questionable language in their respective provisions. Perhaps their
most valuable aspects with relation to group therapy are not only that
they could be interpreted to grant it a privilege under their present
terms, but also that they have shown a susceptibility of multiple-person
privileges to legislative approval. The basic approach of these statutes
is progressive, and it would require only slight adjustments of their
terminology to create an excellent prototype for a decisive group
33. The comparable clause in the Illinois Statute reads :" . . or between any of
the foregoing and such persons under the supervision of a psychiatrist in the accomplishment of the objectives of diagnosis or treatment."
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privilege statute. By combining the "psychotherapist" approach of the
California statute with the privilege-granting language of -the Connecticut and Illinois statutes, the benefits of each could be utilized. The
questionable language in the present statutes which seemingly creates
problems of psychologist groups not being covered or of communications between patients being unprivileged would be clarified, and the
statute created would adequately equip the courts to acknowledge a
privilege for any group therapy patient claiming it.
The needs of group therapy for this kind of statutory protection
are justifiable. No litigation has yet arisen over the problem of a group
privilege, but it should be realized that for every compelled judicial
disclosure that may arise, there could be many people rendered
reluctant to respond to group therapy as a result of their knowing
that the response might be used against them. Quite possibly, such
reluctance has already occurred.
Robert Jay Braman

